Anas Imtiaz

Why Musharraf’s trial is almost impossible

// August 30th, 2009 // 3 Comments » // Pakistan

Despite the Supreme Court’s July 31, 2009 verdict declaring the proclamation of emergency by the then president and army chief Pervez Musharraf unconstitutional, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led coalition government is reluctant to institute high treason proceedings against the retired general. This is hardly surprising if seen in the context of the PPP’s relationship with the establishment and the text of Article 6 of the constitution, which deals with high treason.

Contrary to the popular belief and the party’s own profession, the PPP is no longer an anti-establishment outfit. Like other mainstream political parties, the PPP politics aims at securing or preserving power. It may be Pakistan’s single largest political party. It may have a nationwide appeal. In a proper democratic dispensation, such characteristics are all that a political party needs to get power. However, this hardly applies to a cosmetic democracy like Pakistan. If the past is any guide, the quest for securing or preserving political power in Pakistan is doomed to end up in failure without a nod from the establishment — the power behind the throne. The PPP’s own experience bears out this unpleasant and hard fact.

Probably none knows this better than the top leadership of the PPP, and that too by personal experience. In 1988 general elections, the PPP, despite all odds, had emerged as the single largest party and the only one which won seats from all the four provinces. But that was not enough for the party to form the government. The PPP had to reach a compromise with the establishment — that it would support the then acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan in presidential elections which were due a couple of months later — before its chairperson Ms Benazir Bhutto was appointed prime minister.

The decision to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan must have been a very hard one for PPP leadership, because he was an establishment icon with which the party had been at loggerheads during the past decade. But then that was the price the PPP had to pay to enter into the corridors of power. The party leadership preferred power to principles and paid the price soon. In August 1990, when the PPP government headed by Benazir Bhutto was four months short of its second anniversary, the establishment felt that as the baby was trying to stand on its own feet, it was high time to strike its head. Through presidential orders, parliament and the prime minister were dismissed. That was the end of the second PPP and the first Benazir Bhutto government.

In 1993, Nawaz Sharif, the erstwhile blue-eyed boy of the establishment, fell out with his mentors and had to pay the price in the form of his dismissal. Nawaz Sharif’s fall from grace once again forced the establishment to court friendship of the PPP, which itself was desperately trying to get back in the saddle. Elections were held, which the PPP won. The election of the PPP’s own stalwart Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari as president couple of months later strengthened the party’s position and the government seemed to be well set to complete its five-year term, which had never happened in Pakistan before. But that proved an illusion. In reality, the establishment was as strong as ever before. And when it decided to strike, President Leghari dismissed his leader’s government.

Since November 6, 1996, when the PPP government was sacked until its victory in February 2008 elections couple of months after the assassination of Ms Bhutto, the party remained in opposition. Ms Bhutto herself remained in exile for eight years and returned home only in October 2007 after striking a deal with the establishment in the shape of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) giving amnesty to the top party leadership from corruption charges. To the good fortune of the PPP present leadership, Mr Musharraf was weakened by the lawyers’ movement and desperately needed the support of a popular political party. A deal with Mr Nawaz Sharif, whom he had ousted from power in October 1999, was out of the question for the military ruler. Hence, Ms Bhutto’s PPP was the only choice. The deal with the establishment was a clever move on the part of the PPP leadership. The party knew well that notwithstanding all its powers and clout, the establishment needed strong political support to get things moving. Whether there is a military regime or a civilian government, the establishment needs to have a political constituency. That explains why every military government in Pakistan cultivates relations with some political forces and tries to cobble together a political arrangement to further its interest. This also explains why military governments do not live up to their promises of an across-the-board accountability. The very people who have to be made accountable for their acts of omission and commission are needed to provide political support to the regime.

Moreover, the views and policies, particularly those pertaining to foreign policy, of Mr Musharraf and the PPP converged in many respects. Both were pro-West, especially pro US, and had a liberal outlook. With war against religious extremism at the top of its foreign policy agenda, the least the US wanted was a conservative government in Pakistan. When the PPP negotiated the deal with the establishment, it wanted two things in the main: One, fair elections. Two, permission to the PPP leadership to take part in the political process without hindrances, which included withdrawal of cases against them. The establishment accepted both demands. Why and by whom Ms Bhutto was killed is still a mystery despite the fact that her party is in power for last sixteen months. May be on the part of the establishment, the deal was with the PPP and not Ms Bhutto per se.

The PPP won the February 2008 elections and formed the government. But courtesy the seventeenth amendment, effective powers are vested in the office of the president. By that time Mr Musharraf had been so much discredited that his erstwhile supporters agreed that he may be shown the door. The needful was done. However, that was done on certain conditions, the foremost being that the retired army chief would not be tried for his unconstitutional acts. If the PPP leadership breaches the pact, it may also be shown the door.

The foregoing makes it clear why the PPP has linked the trial of Mr Musharraf on high treason charges to a unanimous resolution of parliament despite the fact that constitutionally (Article 6 of the constitution) and legally (High Treason Punishment Act, 1973) this is not required. There cannot be unanimity when there is a single dissent and it is inconceivable that in the entire parliament there is not a single voice opposing the trial of Mr Musharraf. Both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani know this and so does the opposition leader Mr Nawaz Sharif. For the latter, however, it is the most convenient political stick to beat the PPP government with.

It does not mean that the PPP is against Musharrf’s trial. There is no love between them. But the party does not want to bell the cat. May be it wants the judiciary, which it was forced to restore a few months back, to do so and come into conflict with the establishment.

Coming to Article 6, it consists of three clauses or paras. Clause (1) states: ‘Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (2) expands the definition of high treason by stating that ‘Any person aiding or abetting the acts mentioned in Clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (3) enjoins upon parliament to make a law to provide for punishment of a person found guilty of high treason. Accordingly, the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 provides that high treason is punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.

Thus when high treason proceedings are instituted against Mr Musharraf, it is almost certain that those who abetted him, which definitely would be a fairly long list, in his unconstitutional acts would also find themselves in the dock. The trial of one person may turn out to be that of an entire institution.

Source: DAWN

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Operation Rah-e-Haq Must Continue

// May 18th, 2009 // 2 Comments » // Pakistan

Nizam-e-Adl regulation was hailed by most political parties and the people of Pakistan hoping it to be the end of crisis in Swat. ANP and PPP went to their extreme limits to back the aforementioned agreement. President Zardari’s political move of taking it to the Parliament (when everyone was blaming him for causing a delay) was a nice one to avoid having to take the blame. I supported the agreement too, with some reservations. There were two reasons for these reservations. One, that the insurgents would not give up weapons citing cultural reasons. Whatever the culture, no one can keep weapons. I have always said that having a culture to keep weapons in some parts of NWFP is not a valid excuse to maintain such weapons. Secondly, the government was in a very weak position while negotiating with the insurgents.

The politicians made the mistake of vehemently supporting the agreement and trusting the insurgents as if they have never done something wrong. I will come to the polticians in a little while but first I will have my say on the operation that has started now.

The Rah-e-Haq operation that has begun should have started long ago! An area where the army is required to fight for this long, face the kind of weapons they are facing now should have been cleaned up much earlier. There is no point of stopping the operation now, in between. The place needs to be wiped off weapons and insurgents. The enormity of operation has shown the strength of insurgents.

I have a problem with two political parties who are calling for the operation to stop: JI and PTI. How can they support the people having rocket launchers? How can they advocate pardon for people who have slaughtered innocents?

When the Nizam-e-Adl regulation was brought to Parliament, MQM had a valid point disagreeing with it BUT the excuses they used of Talibanization in Karachi, and then asking for people to keep weapons for their protection reeked ill will.

PPP appears helpless, perhaps because the army is calling shots whie PML appears quiet shaping up to take position if USA takes its hands off Zardari.

For now its time to back the Pakistan Army and hope that they are able to wipe off the terrorists once and for all.

Most importantly, the operation must finish as early as possible so that the IDP’s can return to their homeland.

Islamabad’s Policy Shift?

// April 8th, 2009 // 6 Comments » // Pakistan

The international media is beating the drums on the newly acquired confidence of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, that he flaunted at the joint press conference with Admiral Mullen and Richard Holbrooke. Some analysts are cautiously claiming it to be the end of US-Pak marriage and that the relations are likely to sour further.

The BBC, in an article titled ‘Tensions emerge in Pakistan-US relations’ began with the following lines.

The body language said it all.

The normally urbane and mild-mannered Pakistani Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, was firm and spoke in categorical terms.

Meanwhile, Richard Holbrooke chatted quietly with Admiral Mike Mullen – an act that, whatever the intention, was perceived as rude and contemptuous by those present.

Whereas, despite ISPR’s denials of ISI chief’s refusal to meet the American guests, the US think-tank Stratfor has called it a “carefully stage-managed snub..” There are also reports that Pakistan has made it clear that drone attacks must stop, while the US administration rebuked that demand.

The visit by Admiral Mullen and Richard Holbrooke was expected to be a crucial one where Pakistan was expected to be asked to, yet again, “do more.” Instead, it turned out to be complete shock for the Americans.

Pakistan has also demanded to be given the drone technology in order to do more. Meanwhile, according to BBC’s sources “Americans had been given a sharp message to back off” on the issue of maligning the ISI.

Now where has this sudden change of tone come from? Is it just symbolic or does it really have weight? Also it is interesting to note the timing of the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee regarding national security. Apparently, the government, Parliament and the army are finally thinking on the same lines. It may be the case that they have decided to shun the differences in order to present a united, brave face to the US.

While commending the government and the army, lets hope that this little hope of policy change doesn’t blow up in the air.

PML-N Sucks!! *A MUST WATCH*

// February 13th, 2009 // 2 Comments » // Pakistan

This is a must-watch program!!! Watch the complete talk show but if you’re in a hurry just fast forward 20min and watch the through the end. This goon from PML-N was even made a minister in the initial stages.

Click Here To Watch: In Session 29th January

The point here is that if someone hated the Musharraf era and the ministers of that time, is this the way to talk to them? Is this the fuckin democracy they all wanted? I absolutely loathe the Sharif Bros and Co. and this man has given me yet another reason to do so. The way he speaks shows his true colours and intentions. Right now they are talking in this manner to their opponents and if (God forbid) they get the government, they will talk to the people (awam) like this.

Democracy is all about listening to others and being tolerant. So why can’t these assholes do so? Have they forgotten the attempt to make Nawaz Sharif the ameer-ul-momineen?

And since they are so democratic, they should also know that there is a large population in Pakistan that loves Musharraf, and speaking in this manner they are indirectly insulting those people. If they think that Musharraf is to be blamed for all the problems, then the blame goes to Sharif who forced Jahangir Karamat to resign and brought in Musharraf as the COAS. So who is to be blamed? And then tried to fire him (while he was onboard) to bring another change in army leadership. Why was he so desperate? Obviously for that chair! So who’s to be blamed?!!!!!

The Way Forward For Pakistan?

// January 6th, 2009 // 15 Comments » // Pakistan

Despite my proclivity towards Gen. (R) Musharraf and his government, my extreme abhorrence for President Zardari and equally strong feelings of hatred fpr Nawaz Sharif, I would not like to see yet another military coup in the country now. My regular readers may label this a change in my thinking, but it is not. The reasons will be explicated as I present a background for this particular post.

Pakistan is currently surrounded by external threats. The problem of security is compunded with the internal threats. Electricity was always a problem in Karachi, now the whole country faces it. Petrol is mysteriously missing from various large cities. Stock Exchange is being restored to the position of October 99. Higher education sector has taken a bad blow. Political rivalries of the 90’s are back with full throttle. One man is running the show in Pakistan, despite it being a democracy. The list is just endless.

There are calls from certain quarters demanding the topple of the present setup. It is, indeed, extremely unlikely to continue the full tenure (which I guess the ruling elite realises and hence doing all personal favours in haste). Now let us suppose for a moment that the current chaotic conditions continue, pressure grows and Pakistan Army steps again to take control and vow to bring back the country on track. It will be welcomed by the people (again) and they will regret it later, as usual. An army interference at this stage is not a solution because then the politicians will have yet another chance of saying rightly that they weren’t given a chance. For example, if Raja Pervez Ashraf claims to end load-shedding by next year (my understanding being an end to electricity will mean no load-shedding), and the government is being toppled then he can say that he wasn’t allowed to finish his mission. So, the army should exercise patience and let the politicians stay in power for five years. (more…)

Army-Government Confrontation

// December 16th, 2008 // 15 Comments » // Pakistan

The armed forces of Pakistan and the democratic government spearheaded by Zardari may be on the same ground visibly but their actions reflect a completely contrasting and horrifying picture. With the international pressure mounting and extreme threats on most of Pakistan’s border, the need of the hour is a show of unity. Instead the differences are now out, open in air. Gilani and Kiyani may have repeatedly said that there are to differences, but the facts that I pen below proves just the opposite.

When the government took over and made an attempt to bring the ISI under interior ministry, the army used its iron hand to force the government to withdraw. Later came the lame excuses from the government. This was an extreme example of an attempt to gain the high ground by the government which failed.

When President Zardari rescinded his promise of first official visit to China and instead preferred a pilgrimage to the White House, the COAS (Kiyani) flew to China on the same day that Zardari went to USA and also stayed for an exactly same number of days (maybe one less, I can’t remember exactly now). This showed where the government’s inclination was in the developemnt of foreign policy while the army preferred an opposite track.

The defense minister claimed that Pakistan was incapable of hitting down the US drones. Immediately came out the Chief of Air Staff with an in-your-face response that the PAF is fully capable and waiting for a green signal from the government. Again, both parties were at odds.

President Zardari promised never to use the nukes first (changing the policy which the former President framed when he said that the nukes were not made to be shelved). This provoked a reaction not only from the establishment but also the nuclear scientist Dr. Samar Mubarakmand voiced his dissent against this policy. Not surprisingly, the army never agreed and this message was also forwarded to the presidency.

Immediately after the Mumbai attacks PM Gilani acceded to send the ISI chief to India. He was forced on the back foot, bringing shame to Pakistan, only to realize later what he had done (this couldn’t be unintentional). Later, the government tried to save face by claiming that any director-level rep of ISI would be sent and there was some lack of communication. Again, the ISI/army refused.

And now when the IAF jets violated Pakistani airspace, the PAF reacted strongly while the government seems apologetic saying it was an honest mistake. Who are they actually representing? Which side are they on?

It is this internal conflict that makes the enemies brave enough to attack a country. In this in-fight is suffering the sovereignity of Pakistan. If a choice has to be made between the current government and the army, even the harshest critics of army will be forced to reconsider.

Pakistan Zindabad!

And When They Did This…

// June 28th, 2008 // No Comments » // Politics

“Pakistan launches major offensive against Taliban hideouts” – this is the first news item at my homepage of Yahoo!. A couple of days back the PM and his cabinet gave full authority to the Army Chief for the use of force in the region to maintain peace. The use of force has begun after a brief hiatus. Citing threats to Peshawar as one of the major reasons, the Interior Ministry and the government, in general, are defending their actions and are trying to give various reasons to prepare the people for another battle in tribal belt. This same bunch of people, and the defense analysts (now called the government) were critical of Pervez Musharraf and the previous government of PML-Q for doing just this. They lured the people into believing that the Army is attacking the citizens of Pakistan, and what not.

Now, the same thing is happening again. Is this somehow legitimate because the government is elected? Was Pervez Musharraf not a farsighted person then, who could foresee a bigger threat, as it is claimed now, and he tried to clamp the surge in militancy with the use of force? He was labeled military-minded for doing this. What has changed now that the use of force is unavoidable? Despite claims of talks to ease out the situation, the government has realized that there is no way out of this, without the use of force. The army is given the authority (as if it never had), ohh! why will army decide? Did the House vote for this? Was this even brought to the Parliament? Wasn’t this the issue that the Parliament should decide and not the Army? It was, then, but not now. Why? Because the viewpoint changes with the seating arrangement in the Parliament.

The Past of Ex-Servicemen

// June 21st, 2008 // No Comments » // Pakistan

I came across this excellent compilation at Pak Tea House, an eye-opener which will help us in determining the credibility of the recent comments of the ex-servicemen. It is to be noted in these profiles of men who enjoyed highly esteemed positions and benefits, that each of them had this proclivity towards Nawaz Sharif, mostly during the days of IJI.

Lt Gen (R) Hameed Gul

The former head of ISI, Lt Gen (retd) Hameed Gul played prime role in Afghan War against the former Soviet Union. A die-hard supporter of mujahideen, he is often held responsible by many for the spread of heroine and klashnikov culture in the country. Hameed Gul is also blamed for planning the disastrous Jalalabad operation in 1989 in which mujahideen suffered a major loss. The defeat was imminent as mujahideen did not have the capacity to capture a major city.

Gul also boasts of having organised the IJI against the PPP and spearheading ‘Operation Jackal,’ a plot by the ISI to topple Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990. Gen (retd) Gul had great liking for Nawaz Sharif for being the head of the political organisation engineered by the ISI. On the other hand, he was one of the persons who were accused by Benazir Bhutto of conspiring to kill her after she returned to Pakistan on October 18, 2007. Gen (retd) served a legal notice on Bhutto for falsely levelling allegation against him.

It is said that for his liking for Nawaz Sharif, Gen Asif Nawaz developed differences with him and appointed him DG, Heavy Industries Taxila in 1991. Gul refused to take the assignment after which he was retired from the army.

Senior columnist Ardeshir Cowasjee criticises Gul for taking too much benefits from the army. He has especially talked about his transport business, making ample use of his army connections for the purpose.

These days, Gul speaks vehemently against American policies. But it is said that it was during his tenure as DG ISI that the US ambassador was allowed to attend the meetings of Afghan Cell of Benazir government. The very decision to launch Jalalabad offensive in 1989 is also said to have been made in one such meetings.

Read the complete article with profiles of most famous ex-servicemen at Pak Tea House.

The Wannabe Heroes: Ex-Servicemen

// June 14th, 2008 // No Comments » // Pakistan

THE retired servicemen seem to have rebelled against President Musharraf calling for his impeachment and trial for planning the Kargil operation. In a press conference held on June 4, a group of retired servicemen demanded Gen Musharraf’s trial, restoration of judiciary, revision of the Kashmir policy and the revoking of the controversial NRO.

An important point raised during the meeting was to investigate the Kargil crisis which cost Pakistan a lot of money, precious lives and reputation.

While an audit of military operations by the government is certainly needed, the important question which must be asked is that is this press conference just a ‘rebellion’ of ‘civilianised’ army men against the former army chief in defence of democracy and higher political values in the country?

(more…)

Gulzar Kiyani’s Revelations Are Futile

// June 3rd, 2008 // 15 Comments » // Pakistan

Lt. Gen (r) Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani, in an interview, explained in excruciating details the dark past of General (r) Pervez Musharraf. Some politicians (at least one, for sure) and the media is giving this a wide coverage. Others are congratulating the retired army man for spilling out his guts on free and fair media. Sure, but why did he do this after serving as the Corps Commander of the all-sensitive Rawalpindi Corps shortly after the 1999 coup and then later serving as the Chairman of Federal Public Service Commission, from which he was recently removed. In fact, in the interview he claimed he “doesn’t know why Musharraf made him the Chairman of FPSC.” So why did he take up the job? Probably he doesn’t know.

The allegations or comments lack credibility and are worthless now because they have come at a time when a similar campaign is being run by Nawaz Sharif and these comments at this time merely add to that. Perhaps, the so-called revelations would’ve held worth had the retired lieutenant general spoken earlier while serving in the army and following the commands of his boss. Serving his complete tenure, and not doing anything at that time makes him equally liable and responsible (maybe more) for the turbulent times now for which he blames Musharraf.