Why Musharraf’s trial is almost impossible

Despite the Supreme Court’s July 31, 2009 verdict declaring the proclamation of emergency by the then president and army chief Pervez Musharraf unconstitutional, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led coalition government is reluctant to institute high treason proceedings against the retired general. This is hardly surprising if seen in the context of the PPP’s relationship with the establishment and the text of Article 6 of the constitution, which deals with high treason.

Contrary to the popular belief and the party’s own profession, the PPP is no longer an anti-establishment outfit. Like other mainstream political parties, the PPP politics aims at securing or preserving power. It may be Pakistan’s single largest political party. It may have a nationwide appeal. In a proper democratic dispensation, such characteristics are all that a political party needs to get power. However, this hardly applies to a cosmetic democracy like Pakistan. If the past is any guide, the quest for securing or preserving political power in Pakistan is doomed to end up in failure without a nod from the establishment — the power behind the throne. The PPP’s own experience bears out this unpleasant and hard fact.

Probably none knows this better than the top leadership of the PPP, and that too by personal experience. In 1988 general elections, the PPP, despite all odds, had emerged as the single largest party and the only one which won seats from all the four provinces. But that was not enough for the party to form the government. The PPP had to reach a compromise with the establishment — that it would support the then acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan in presidential elections which were due a couple of months later — before its chairperson Ms Benazir Bhutto was appointed prime minister.

The decision to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan must have been a very hard one for PPP leadership, because he was an establishment icon with which the party had been at loggerheads during the past decade. But then that was the price the PPP had to pay to enter into the corridors of power. The party leadership preferred power to principles and paid the price soon. In August 1990, when the PPP government headed by Benazir Bhutto was four months short of its second anniversary, the establishment felt that as the baby was trying to stand on its own feet, it was high time to strike its head. Through presidential orders, parliament and the prime minister were dismissed. That was the end of the second PPP and the first Benazir Bhutto government.

In 1993, Nawaz Sharif, the erstwhile blue-eyed boy of the establishment, fell out with his mentors and had to pay the price in the form of his dismissal. Nawaz Sharif’s fall from grace once again forced the establishment to court friendship of the PPP, which itself was desperately trying to get back in the saddle. Elections were held, which the PPP won. The election of the PPP’s own stalwart Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari as president couple of months later strengthened the party’s position and the government seemed to be well set to complete its five-year term, which had never happened in Pakistan before. But that proved an illusion. In reality, the establishment was as strong as ever before. And when it decided to strike, President Leghari dismissed his leader’s government.

Since November 6, 1996, when the PPP government was sacked until its victory in February 2008 elections couple of months after the assassination of Ms Bhutto, the party remained in opposition. Ms Bhutto herself remained in exile for eight years and returned home only in October 2007 after striking a deal with the establishment in the shape of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) giving amnesty to the top party leadership from corruption charges. To the good fortune of the PPP present leadership, Mr Musharraf was weakened by the lawyers’ movement and desperately needed the support of a popular political party. A deal with Mr Nawaz Sharif, whom he had ousted from power in October 1999, was out of the question for the military ruler. Hence, Ms Bhutto’s PPP was the only choice. The deal with the establishment was a clever move on the part of the PPP leadership. The party knew well that notwithstanding all its powers and clout, the establishment needed strong political support to get things moving. Whether there is a military regime or a civilian government, the establishment needs to have a political constituency. That explains why every military government in Pakistan cultivates relations with some political forces and tries to cobble together a political arrangement to further its interest. This also explains why military governments do not live up to their promises of an across-the-board accountability. The very people who have to be made accountable for their acts of omission and commission are needed to provide political support to the regime.

Moreover, the views and policies, particularly those pertaining to foreign policy, of Mr Musharraf and the PPP converged in many respects. Both were pro-West, especially pro US, and had a liberal outlook. With war against religious extremism at the top of its foreign policy agenda, the least the US wanted was a conservative government in Pakistan. When the PPP negotiated the deal with the establishment, it wanted two things in the main: One, fair elections. Two, permission to the PPP leadership to take part in the political process without hindrances, which included withdrawal of cases against them. The establishment accepted both demands. Why and by whom Ms Bhutto was killed is still a mystery despite the fact that her party is in power for last sixteen months. May be on the part of the establishment, the deal was with the PPP and not Ms Bhutto per se.

The PPP won the February 2008 elections and formed the government. But courtesy the seventeenth amendment, effective powers are vested in the office of the president. By that time Mr Musharraf had been so much discredited that his erstwhile supporters agreed that he may be shown the door. The needful was done. However, that was done on certain conditions, the foremost being that the retired army chief would not be tried for his unconstitutional acts. If the PPP leadership breaches the pact, it may also be shown the door.

The foregoing makes it clear why the PPP has linked the trial of Mr Musharraf on high treason charges to a unanimous resolution of parliament despite the fact that constitutionally (Article 6 of the constitution) and legally (High Treason Punishment Act, 1973) this is not required. There cannot be unanimity when there is a single dissent and it is inconceivable that in the entire parliament there is not a single voice opposing the trial of Mr Musharraf. Both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani know this and so does the opposition leader Mr Nawaz Sharif. For the latter, however, it is the most convenient political stick to beat the PPP government with.

It does not mean that the PPP is against Musharrf’s trial. There is no love between them. But the party does not want to bell the cat. May be it wants the judiciary, which it was forced to restore a few months back, to do so and come into conflict with the establishment.

Coming to Article 6, it consists of three clauses or paras. Clause (1) states: ‘Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (2) expands the definition of high treason by stating that ‘Any person aiding or abetting the acts mentioned in Clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (3) enjoins upon parliament to make a law to provide for punishment of a person found guilty of high treason. Accordingly, the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 provides that high treason is punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.

Thus when high treason proceedings are instituted against Mr Musharraf, it is almos
t certain that those who abetted him, which definitely would be a fairly long list, in his unconstitutional acts would also find themselves in the dock. The trial of one person may turn out to be that of an entire institution.

Source: DAWN

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Operation Rah-e-Haq Must Continue

Nizam-e-Adl regulation was hailed by most political parties and the people of Pakistan hoping it to be the end of crisis in Swat. ANP and PPP went to their extreme limits to back the aforementioned agreement. President Zardari’s political move of taking it to the Parliament (when everyone was blaming him for causing a delay) was a nice one to avoid having to take the blame. I supported the agreement too, with some reservations. There were two reasons for these reservations. One, that the insurgents would not give up weapons citing cultural reasons. Whatever the culture, no one can keep weapons. I have always said that having a culture to keep weapons in some parts of NWFP is not a valid excuse to maintain such weapons. Secondly, the government was in a very weak position while negotiating with the insurgents.

The politicians made the mistake of vehemently supporting the agreement and trusting the insurgents as if they have never done something wrong. I will come to the polticians in a little while but first I will have my say on the operation that has started now.

The Rah-e-Haq operation that has begun should have started long ago! An area where the army is required to fight for this long, face the kind of weapons they are facing now should have been cleaned up much earlier. There is no point of stopping the operation now, in between. The place needs to be wiped off weapons and insurgents. The enormity of operation has shown the strength of insurgents.

I have a problem with two political parties who are calling for the operation to stop: JI and PTI. How can they support the people having rocket launchers? How can they advocate pardon for people who have slaughtered innocents?

When the Nizam-e-Adl regulation was brought to Parliament, MQM had a valid point disagreeing with it BUT the excuses they used of Talibanization in Karachi, and then asking for people to keep weapons for their protection reeked ill will.

PPP appears helpless, perhaps because the army is calling shots whie PML appears quiet shaping up to take position if USA takes its hands off Zardari.

For now its time to back the Pakistan Army and hope that they are able to wipe off the terrorists once and for all.

Most importantly, the operation must finish as early as possible so that the IDP’s can return to their homeland.

Islamabad's Policy Shift?

The international media is beating the drums on the newly acquired confidence of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, that he flaunted at the joint press conference with Admiral Mullen and Richard Holbrooke. Some analysts are cautiously claiming it to be the end of US-Pak marriage and that the relations are likely to sour further.

The BBC, in an article titled ‘Tensions emerge in Pakistan-US relations’ began with the following lines.

The body language said it all.

The normally urbane and mild-mannered Pakistani Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, was firm and spoke in categorical terms.

Meanwhile, Richard Holbrooke chatted quietly with Admiral Mike Mullen – an act that, whatever the intention, was perceived as rude and contemptuous by those present.

Whereas, despite ISPR’s denials of ISI chief’s refusal to meet the American guests, the US think-tank Stratfor has called it a “carefully stage-managed snub..” There are also reports that Pakistan has made it clear that drone attacks must stop, while the US administration rebuked that demand.

The visit by Admiral Mullen and Richard Holbrooke was expected to be a crucial one where Pakistan was expected to be asked to, yet again, “do more.” Instead, it turned out to be complete shock for the Americans.

Pakistan has also demanded to be given the drone technology in order to do more. Meanwhile, according to BBC’s sources “Americans had been given a sharp message to back off” on the issue of maligning the ISI.

Now where has this sudden change of tone come from? Is it just symbolic or does it really have weight? Also it is interesting to note the timing of the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee regarding national security. Apparently, the government, Parliament and the army are finally thinking on the same lines. It may be the case that they have decided to shun the differences in order to present a united, brave face to the US.

While commending the government and the army, lets hope that this little hope of policy change doesn’t blow up in the air.

PML-N Sucks!! *A MUST WATCH*

This is a must-watch program!!! Watch the complete talk show but if you’re in a hurry just fast forward 20min and watch the through the end. This goon from PML-N was even made a minister in the initial stages.

Click Here To Watch: In Session 29th January

The point here is that if someone hated the Musharraf era and the ministers of that time, is this the way to talk to them? Is this the fuckin democracy they all wanted? I absolutely loathe the Sharif Bros and Co. and this man has given me yet another reason to do so. The way he speaks shows his true colours and intentions. Right now they are talking in this manner to their opponents and if (God forbid) they get the government, they will talk to the people (awam) like this.

Democracy is all about listening to others and being tolerant. So why can’t these assholes do so? Have they forgotten the attempt to make Nawaz Sharif the ameer-ul-momineen?

And since they are so democratic, they should also know that there is a large population in Pakistan that loves Musharraf, and speaking in this manner they are indirectly insulting those people. If they think that Musharraf is to be blamed for all the problems, then the blame goes to Sharif who forced Jahangir Karamat to resign and brought in Musharraf as the COAS. So who is to be blamed? And then tried to fire him (while he was onboard) to bring another change in army leadership. Why was he so desperate? Obviously for that chair! So who’s to be blamed?!!!!!

The Way Forward For Pakistan?

Despite my proclivity towards Gen. (R) Musharraf and his government, my extreme abhorrence for President Zardari and equally strong feelings of hatred fpr Nawaz Sharif, I would not like to see yet another military coup in the country now. My regular readers may label this a change in my thinking, but it is not. The reasons will be explicated as I present a background for this particular post.

Pakistan is currently surrounded by external threats. The problem of security is compunded with the internal threats. Electricity was always a problem in Karachi, now the whole country faces it. Petrol is mysteriously missing from various large cities. Stock Exchange is being restored to the position of October 99. Higher education sector has taken a bad blow. Political rivalries of the 90′s are back with full throttle. One man is running the show in Pakistan, despite it being a democracy. The list is just endless.

There are calls from certain quarters demanding the topple of the present setup. It is, indeed, extremely unlikely to continue the full tenure (which I guess the ruling elite realises and hence doing all personal favours in haste). Now let us suppose for a moment that the current chaotic conditions continue, pressure grows and Pakistan Army steps again to take control and vow to bring back the country on track. It will be welcomed by the people (again) and they will regret it later, as usual. An army interference at this stage is not a solution because then the politicians will have yet another chance of saying rightly that they weren’t given a chance. For example, if Raja Pervez Ashraf claims to end load-shedding by next year (my understanding being an end to electricity will mean no load-shedding), and the government is being toppled then he can say that he wasn’t allowed to finish his mission. So, the army should exercise patience and let the politicians stay in power for five years. (more…)