Anas Imtiaz

4th July 1999: When We Surrendered…

// July 4th, 2008 // 2 Comments » // Pakistan

This is the continuation of the excerpts from Bruce Reidel’s policy papers which gives the intricate details of the abrupt pullback of the Pakistani forces from Kargil. This happened on the 4th of July, 1999, the U.S. Independece Day, or the day when our PM compromised our independence. Make sure you’ve read the earlier part of this to understand the desperate conditions in which the following took place.

THE 4TH DAWNS

The President’s advisers gathered early on the 4th to brief him on the meeting ahead and provide advice. The mood was somber. Sandy Berger opened the session by telling the President that this could be the most important foreign policy meeting of his Presidency because the stakes could include nuclear war. He had to press Sharif to withdraw while also giving him enough cover to keep him in office to deliver the retreat. Strobe noted the importance of being very clear with Nawaz and not letting the Prime Minister be alone with the President so that he could later claim commitments not made. A record of who said what was critical. Rick and I briefed the President on the latest information we had.

There was more disturbing information about Pakistan preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible use. I recommended that he use this only when Sharif was without his aides, particularly not when the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad, who was known to be very close to Pakistani military intelligence (ISI) was in earshot.

Bandar called and told me the results of his discussion with Sharif. The PM was distraught, deeply worried about the direction the crisis was going toward disaster, but equally worried about his own hold on power and the threat from his military chiefs who were pressing for a tough stand. I briefed the President and the team. He said he was ready to go and we crossed Pennsylvania Avenue to Blair House. Sharif had a couple of hours to rest and refresh himself since his arrival early in the morning. The President’s meeting opened at around 1:30 in the afternoon with a plenary session with their teams. The President began by noting he had to travel on the 5th to America’s poorest states, a long planned event to help eradicate poverty in America and thus was glad the PM could be available on the 4th. He then framed the day’s discussion by handing the PM a cartoon from the day’s Chicago Tribune newspaper that showed Pakistan and India as nuclear bombs fighting with each other. Clinton said this is what worried him.

Sharif opened by thanking the President for resolving the long outstanding quarrel between the two countries over the suspended delivery of F16 fighters — suspended when sanctions were imposed in 1990. Clinton had secured a sizable cash payment to Pakistan that compensated Islamabad for the cost of the never delivered fighters.

Sharif then went into a long and predictable defense of the Kashmiri cause. He appealed to the President to intervene directly to settle the dispute by pressing India. Much of his argumentation we had heard before — only the U.S. could save a billion and a half South Asians from war, if only the President would devote 1% of the effort he gave to the Arab-Israeli dispute to Kashmir it would be resolved, etc. The President pushed back by reminding Sharif that the U.S. played a role in the Arab-Israeli conflict because both sides invited it to mediate, that is not the case with Kashmir. The best approach was the road begun at Lahore, that is direct contact with India. Pakistan had completely undermined that opening by attacking at Kargil, it must now retreat before disaster set in.

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3rd July 1999: Desperate Nawaz Calls for Help

// July 3rd, 2008 // 5 Comments » // Pakistan

On the 3rd, Sharif was more desperate and told the President he was ready to come immediately to Washington to seek our help. The President repeated his caution — come only if you are ready to withdraw, I can’t help you if you are not ready to pull back. He urged Sharif to consider carefully the wisdom of a trip to Washington under these constraints. Sharif said he was coming and would be there on the 4th.

The White House and State Department spent much of the rest of the 3rd preparing. Logistics were one problem. Blair House had to be made available for the Pakistanis and the Secret Service needed to secure Pennsylvania Avenue. As any visitor to the Mall on a 4th of July knows, tens of thousands of Americans come down to the Mall to see the fireworks, many come via the area around the White House and would be inconvenienced by a shutdown of Pennsylvania Avenue.

A small group also prepared for the substance of the encounter. I led the effort at the NSC to prepare the President, National Security Advisor Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger and Chief of Staff John Podesta. The State effort was led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the senior point man on South Asian issues in the Department and Karl (Rick) Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs at State, whose bureau had the strongest expertise on the Subcontinent in the U.S. government. Strobe, Rick and I had already logged many hours traveling to South Asia to work to advance the President’s agenda of improving our relations with this too long neglected part of the world.

The product of this work was two pieces of paper. The first was a draft statement the President would issue if Sharif agreed to pulling back his forces to the LOC, the second a statement which would be used if Sharif refused. The latter would make clear that the blame for the crisis in South Asia lay solely with Pakistan.

On the third, more information developed about the escalating military situation in the area — disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment. Sharif’s intentions also became clearer. He was bringing his wife and children with him to Washington, a possible indication that he was afraid he might not be able to go home if the summit failed or that the military was telling him to leave. At a minimum, Sharif seemed to be hedging his bet on whether this would be a round trip.

Sharif would be met at Dulles Airport, where his commercial PIA flight was being diverted to from JFK, by the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Bandar had a long history of helping assist key American diplomatic initiatives and also had worked with Pakistan extensively in the past during the Afghan war against the Soviets. Bandar asked for a briefing on what the President needed from Sharif. I met with him in his McLean home and gave him our sense of the crisis. Bandar promised to weigh in forcefully with Sharif on the ride from Dulles to Blair House, and he secured Crown Prince Abdullah’s support for our position.

British Prime Minister Blair also contacted Sharif to weigh in as well on the need for withdrawal. Like us, the British were increasingly worried over the direction the crisis was headed and the danger of escalation to full- scale war. Other governments, including Pakistan’s ally China, shared these concerns as well and we asked Beijing to weigh in with Islamabad. We concluded that the Chinese played a constructive role in trying to defuse the crisis.

Reproduced from Policy Paper Series titled American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, by Bruce Reidel – CASI, University of Pennsylvania

Sharif Knew About Kargil (Mis)Adventure: Former ISI Chief

// June 15th, 2008 // 1 Comment » // Pakistan

The latest series of confession comes from the head of ISI during the Kargil War, Lt. Gen. Ziauddin. He is the man Nawaz Sharif later appointed as the COAS while attempting to remove Musharraf in air. The latest series of revelations come in a book titled Cross Roads by Shuja Nawaz (brother of the COAS Asif Nawaz Janjua). The book is being released by Oxford University Press. Here is the piece of news article which carried the pre-launch startling story.

Pakistan had sought the services of “20,000 to 30,000” Afghan jihadis as possible reinforcements during the Kargil conflict nine years ago, a new book by Pakistani author Shuja Nawaz reveals.

“Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, the Afghan President at the time… was asked by Pakistan to provide 20,000-30,000 ‘volunteers’ for the Kashmir jihad. He startled the Pakistanis by offering 500,000!” Shuja Nawaz, whose brother Asif Nawaz was army chief in the 1990s, says in his 585-page Crossed Swords.

This damning nugget of information is attributed to an interview with Khwaja Ziauddin, who was the ISI boss during Kargil and the man appointed to replace Pervez Musharraf as army chief on October 12, 1999, by then PM Nawaz Sharif.

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The Wannabe Heroes: Ex-Servicemen

// June 14th, 2008 // No Comments » // Pakistan

THE retired servicemen seem to have rebelled against President Musharraf calling for his impeachment and trial for planning the Kargil operation. In a press conference held on June 4, a group of retired servicemen demanded Gen Musharraf’s trial, restoration of judiciary, revision of the Kashmir policy and the revoking of the controversial NRO.

An important point raised during the meeting was to investigate the Kargil crisis which cost Pakistan a lot of money, precious lives and reputation.

While an audit of military operations by the government is certainly needed, the important question which must be asked is that is this press conference just a ‘rebellion’ of ‘civilianised’ army men against the former army chief in defence of democracy and higher political values in the country?

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