// August 30th, 2009 // 3 Comments » // Pakistan
Despite the Supreme Court’s July 31, 2009 verdict declaring the proclamation of emergency by the then president and army chief Pervez Musharraf unconstitutional, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led coalition government is reluctant to institute high treason proceedings against the retired general. This is hardly surprising if seen in the context of the PPP’s relationship with the establishment and the text of Article 6 of the constitution, which deals with high treason.
Contrary to the popular belief and the party’s own profession, the PPP is no longer an anti-establishment outfit. Like other mainstream political parties, the PPP politics aims at securing or preserving power. It may be Pakistan’s single largest political party. It may have a nationwide appeal. In a proper democratic dispensation, such characteristics are all that a political party needs to get power. However, this hardly applies to a cosmetic democracy like Pakistan. If the past is any guide, the quest for securing or preserving political power in Pakistan is doomed to end up in failure without a nod from the establishment — the power behind the throne. The PPP’s own experience bears out this unpleasant and hard fact.
Probably none knows this better than the top leadership of the PPP, and that too by personal experience. In 1988 general elections, the PPP, despite all odds, had emerged as the single largest party and the only one which won seats from all the four provinces. But that was not enough for the party to form the government. The PPP had to reach a compromise with the establishment — that it would support the then acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan in presidential elections which were due a couple of months later — before its chairperson Ms Benazir Bhutto was appointed prime minister.
The decision to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan must have been a very hard one for PPP leadership, because he was an establishment icon with which the party had been at loggerheads during the past decade. But then that was the price the PPP had to pay to enter into the corridors of power. The party leadership preferred power to principles and paid the price soon. In August 1990, when the PPP government headed by Benazir Bhutto was four months short of its second anniversary, the establishment felt that as the baby was trying to stand on its own feet, it was high time to strike its head. Through presidential orders, parliament and the prime minister were dismissed. That was the end of the second PPP and the first Benazir Bhutto government.
In 1993, Nawaz Sharif, the erstwhile blue-eyed boy of the establishment, fell out with his mentors and had to pay the price in the form of his dismissal. Nawaz Sharif’s fall from grace once again forced the establishment to court friendship of the PPP, which itself was desperately trying to get back in the saddle. Elections were held, which the PPP won. The election of the PPP’s own stalwart Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari as president couple of months later strengthened the party’s position and the government seemed to be well set to complete its five-year term, which had never happened in Pakistan before. But that proved an illusion. In reality, the establishment was as strong as ever before. And when it decided to strike, President Leghari dismissed his leader’s government.
Since November 6, 1996, when the PPP government was sacked until its victory in February 2008 elections couple of months after the assassination of Ms Bhutto, the party remained in opposition. Ms Bhutto herself remained in exile for eight years and returned home only in October 2007 after striking a deal with the establishment in the shape of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) giving amnesty to the top party leadership from corruption charges. To the good fortune of the PPP present leadership, Mr Musharraf was weakened by the lawyers’ movement and desperately needed the support of a popular political party. A deal with Mr Nawaz Sharif, whom he had ousted from power in October 1999, was out of the question for the military ruler. Hence, Ms Bhutto’s PPP was the only choice. The deal with the establishment was a clever move on the part of the PPP leadership. The party knew well that notwithstanding all its powers and clout, the establishment needed strong political support to get things moving. Whether there is a military regime or a civilian government, the establishment needs to have a political constituency. That explains why every military government in Pakistan cultivates relations with some political forces and tries to cobble together a political arrangement to further its interest. This also explains why military governments do not live up to their promises of an across-the-board accountability. The very people who have to be made accountable for their acts of omission and commission are needed to provide political support to the regime.
Moreover, the views and policies, particularly those pertaining to foreign policy, of Mr Musharraf and the PPP converged in many respects. Both were pro-West, especially pro US, and had a liberal outlook. With war against religious extremism at the top of its foreign policy agenda, the least the US wanted was a conservative government in Pakistan. When the PPP negotiated the deal with the establishment, it wanted two things in the main: One, fair elections. Two, permission to the PPP leadership to take part in the political process without hindrances, which included withdrawal of cases against them. The establishment accepted both demands. Why and by whom Ms Bhutto was killed is still a mystery despite the fact that her party is in power for last sixteen months. May be on the part of the establishment, the deal was with the PPP and not Ms Bhutto per se.
The PPP won the February 2008 elections and formed the government. But courtesy the seventeenth amendment, effective powers are vested in the office of the president. By that time Mr Musharraf had been so much discredited that his erstwhile supporters agreed that he may be shown the door. The needful was done. However, that was done on certain conditions, the foremost being that the retired army chief would not be tried for his unconstitutional acts. If the PPP leadership breaches the pact, it may also be shown the door.
The foregoing makes it clear why the PPP has linked the trial of Mr Musharraf on high treason charges to a unanimous resolution of parliament despite the fact that constitutionally (Article 6 of the constitution) and legally (High Treason Punishment Act, 1973) this is not required. There cannot be unanimity when there is a single dissent and it is inconceivable that in the entire parliament there is not a single voice opposing the trial of Mr Musharraf. Both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani know this and so does the opposition leader Mr Nawaz Sharif. For the latter, however, it is the most convenient political stick to beat the PPP government with.
It does not mean that the PPP is against Musharrf’s trial. There is no love between them. But the party does not want to bell the cat. May be it wants the judiciary, which it was forced to restore a few months back, to do so and come into conflict with the establishment.
Coming to Article 6, it consists of three clauses or paras. Clause (1) states: ‘Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (2) expands the definition of high treason by stating that ‘Any person aiding or abetting the acts mentioned in Clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (3) enjoins upon parliament to make a law to provide for punishment of a person found guilty of high treason. Accordingly, the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 provides that high treason is punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.
Thus when high treason proceedings are instituted against Mr Musharraf, it is almost certain that those who abetted him, which definitely would be a fairly long list, in his unconstitutional acts would also find themselves in the dock. The trial of one person may turn out to be that of an entire institution.
Source: DAWN
Posted via email using Posterous
