Why Musharraf’s trial is almost impossible
Despite the Supreme Court’s July 31, 2009 verdict declaring the proclamation of emergency by the then president and army chief Pervez Musharraf unconstitutional, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led coalition government is reluctant to institute high treason proceedings against the retired general. This is hardly surprising if seen in the context of the PPP’s relationship with the establishment and the text of Article 6 of the constitution, which deals with high treason.
Contrary to the popular belief and the party’s own profession, the PPP is no longer an anti-establishment outfit. Like other mainstream political parties, the PPP politics aims at securing or preserving power. It may be Pakistan’s single largest political party. It may have a nationwide appeal. In a proper democratic dispensation, such characteristics are all that a political party needs to get power. However, this hardly applies to a cosmetic democracy like Pakistan. If the past is any guide, the quest for securing or preserving political power in Pakistan is doomed to end up in failure without a nod from the establishment — the power behind the throne. The PPP’s own experience bears out this unpleasant and hard fact.
Probably none knows this better than the top leadership of the PPP, and that too by personal experience. In 1988 general elections, the PPP, despite all odds, had emerged as the single largest party and the only one which won seats from all the four provinces. But that was not enough for the party to form the government. The PPP had to reach a compromise with the establishment — that it would support the then acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan in presidential elections which were due a couple of months later — before its chairperson Ms Benazir Bhutto was appointed prime minister.
The decision to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan must have been a very hard one for PPP leadership, because he was an establishment icon with which the party had been at loggerheads during the past decade. But then that was the price the PPP had to pay to enter into the corridors of power. The party leadership preferred power to principles and paid the price soon. In August 1990, when the PPP government headed by Benazir Bhutto was four months short of its second anniversary, the establishment felt that as the baby was trying to stand on its own feet, it was high time to strike its head. Through presidential orders, parliament and the prime minister were dismissed. That was the end of the second PPP and the first Benazir Bhutto government.
In 1993, Nawaz Sharif, the erstwhile blue-eyed boy of the establishment, fell out with his mentors and had to pay the price in the form of his dismissal. Nawaz Sharif’s fall from grace once again forced the establishment to court friendship of the PPP, which itself was desperately trying to get back in the saddle. Elections were held, which the PPP won. The election of the PPP’s own stalwart Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari as president couple of months later strengthened the party’s position and the government seemed to be well set to complete its five-year term, which had never happened in Pakistan before. But that proved an illusion. In reality, the establishment was as strong as ever before. And when it decided to strike, President Leghari dismissed his leader’s government.
Since November 6, 1996, when the PPP government was sacked until its victory in February 2008 elections couple of months after the assassination of Ms Bhutto, the party remained in opposition. Ms Bhutto herself remained in exile for eight years and returned home only in October 2007 after striking a deal with the establishment in the shape of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) giving amnesty to the top party leadership from corruption charges. To the good fortune of the PPP present leadership, Mr Musharraf was weakened by the lawyers’ movement and desperately needed the support of a popular political party. A deal with Mr Nawaz Sharif, whom he had ousted from power in October 1999, was out of the question for the military ruler. Hence, Ms Bhutto’s PPP was the only choice. The deal with the establishment was a clever move on the part of the PPP leadership. The party knew well that notwithstanding all its powers and clout, the establishment needed strong political support to get things moving. Whether there is a military regime or a civilian government, the establishment needs to have a political constituency. That explains why every military government in Pakistan cultivates relations with some political forces and tries to cobble together a political arrangement to further its interest. This also explains why military governments do not live up to their promises of an across-the-board accountability. The very people who have to be made accountable for their acts of omission and commission are needed to provide political support to the regime.
Moreover, the views and policies, particularly those pertaining to foreign policy, of Mr Musharraf and the PPP converged in many respects. Both were pro-West, especially pro US, and had a liberal outlook. With war against religious extremism at the top of its foreign policy agenda, the least the US wanted was a conservative government in Pakistan. When the PPP negotiated the deal with the establishment, it wanted two things in the main: One, fair elections. Two, permission to the PPP leadership to take part in the political process without hindrances, which included withdrawal of cases against them. The establishment accepted both demands. Why and by whom Ms Bhutto was killed is still a mystery despite the fact that her party is in power for last sixteen months. May be on the part of the establishment, the deal was with the PPP and not Ms Bhutto per se.
The PPP won the February 2008 elections and formed the government. But courtesy the seventeenth amendment, effective powers are vested in the office of the president. By that time Mr Musharraf had been so much discredited that his erstwhile supporters agreed that he may be shown the door. The needful was done. However, that was done on certain conditions, the foremost being that the retired army chief would not be tried for his unconstitutional acts. If the PPP leadership breaches the pact, it may also be shown the door.
The foregoing makes it clear why the PPP has linked the trial of Mr Musharraf on high treason charges to a unanimous resolution of parliament despite the fact that constitutionally (Article 6 of the constitution) and legally (High Treason Punishment Act, 1973) this is not required. There cannot be unanimity when there is a single dissent and it is inconceivable that in the entire parliament there is not a single voice opposing the trial of Mr Musharraf. Both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani know this and so does the opposition leader Mr Nawaz Sharif. For the latter, however, it is the most convenient political stick to beat the PPP government with.
It does not mean that the PPP is against Musharrf’s trial. There is no love between them. But the party does not want to bell the cat. May be it wants the judiciary, which it was forced to restore a few months back, to do so and come into conflict with the establishment.
Coming to Article 6, it consists of three clauses or paras. Clause (1) states: ‘Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (2) expands the definition of high treason by stating that ‘Any person aiding or abetting the acts mentioned in Clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.’ Clause (3) enjoins upon parliament to make a law to provide for punishment of a person found guilty of high treason. Accordingly, the High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 provides that high treason is punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.
Thus when high treason proceedings are instituted against Mr Musharraf, it is almos
t certain that those who abetted him, which definitely would be a fairly long list, in his unconstitutional acts would also find themselves in the dock. The trial of one person may turn out to be that of an entire institution.
Source: DAWN
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Will Muslim Leagues Unite? Will We See A New PM?
The imposition of governor rule in Punjab has prompted the factions of Muslim League to realise that this is an attempt of PPP to encroach in their territory. In fact, the PPP has already advanced in the PML zone and this act may just backfire with the unification of PML-N and PML-Q. Can this really happen? There are two important questions that need to be answered.
1. Will the Chaudhrys trust Zardari, given his recent history to break promises and his long-term animosity with them?
2. Will the Chaudhrys and Sharifs patchup?
Any one of these two WILL happen, and that will decide the future direction.
Given the fact that PML-Q has been humiliated in the elections for standing by Pervez Musharraf, there wwill be reluctance among their ranks for supporting PPP, which is widely believed to be following what is touted as Musharraf’s agenda. There have been rumours that Chaudhry Shujaat is asking for the position of Chairman Senate for himself, and the seat of CM Punjab for Moonis Elahi. Again, this may not be popular in their own party primarily because the members were earlier not happy with the leadership of Chaudhrys. And any such deal will directly affect the Chaudhry family rather than providing any benefit to the PML-Q, the party. Then comes the issue of trust. Why will PML-Q believe that PPP will not try to interfere in the politics of Punjab even if CM belongs to PML-Q. It is not a secret that Punjab is the key to rule the center and PPP will try to tighten its grip in Punjab. If a deal is struck between PPP and PML-Q agitation in Punjab will not cease.
The second, and more plausible, option is the (re)unification of PML. Or atleast, support in the assemblies. This can even lead to the overthrow of PPP’s government in center. Since Shahbaz Sharif is now disqualified to be the CM, and Nawaz disqualified to be the PM, it is clear that the future PM from PML-N will be Shahbaz Sharif (an amendment in the Constitution is unlikely in my view). Can PML (N and Q) agree on power sharing formula such that one of them gets the center while the other enjoys Punjab? Certainly possible with the increase in meetings between the members of both the parties…BUT..what about Sindh? Any such government changes will lead to agitation in Sindh! Will MQM join hands with them? They have enjoyed good relations with PML-Q but not with PML-N. Obviously they can join anyone under the banner of national interest.
The second option does look good on paper but the bigger problem is that a change in the leader of House (PM) can easily be resisted by the all-powerful President!
The situation is very complex and conflicting. PPP and PML(N and Q) have a tight hold over one province atleast. In case of any elections, I don’t see them losing grip in their stronghold. In fact, the grip will be tightened. This, sadly, means that whoever forms a government in center will have atleast one large province out of control. Punjab is important from strategic point of view in running the government, while Sindh (read Karachi) is important from economic point of view. The only way out is a harmony, trust and reconciliation. Given the history, this is next to impossible.
Pakistan Ka Khuda Hafiz
The Way Forward For Pakistan?
Despite my proclivity towards Gen. (R) Musharraf and his government, my extreme abhorrence for President Zardari and equally strong feelings of hatred fpr Nawaz Sharif, I would not like to see yet another military coup in the country now. My regular readers may label this a change in my thinking, but it is not. The reasons will be explicated as I present a background for this particular post.
Pakistan is currently surrounded by external threats. The problem of security is compunded with the internal threats. Electricity was always a problem in Karachi, now the whole country faces it. Petrol is mysteriously missing from various large cities. Stock Exchange is being restored to the position of October 99. Higher education sector has taken a bad blow. Political rivalries of the 90′s are back with full throttle. One man is running the show in Pakistan, despite it being a democracy. The list is just endless.
There are calls from certain quarters demanding the topple of the present setup. It is, indeed, extremely unlikely to continue the full tenure (which I guess the ruling elite realises and hence doing all personal favours in haste). Now let us suppose for a moment that the current chaotic conditions continue, pressure grows and Pakistan Army steps again to take control and vow to bring back the country on track. It will be welcomed by the people (again) and they will regret it later, as usual. An army interference at this stage is not a solution because then the politicians will have yet another chance of saying rightly that they weren’t given a chance. For example, if Raja Pervez Ashraf claims to end load-shedding by next year (my understanding being an end to electricity will mean no load-shedding), and the government is being toppled then he can say that he wasn’t allowed to finish his mission. So, the army should exercise patience and let the politicians stay in power for five years. (more…)
Army-Government Confrontation
The armed forces of Pakistan and the democratic government spearheaded by Zardari may be on the same ground visibly but their actions reflect a completely contrasting and horrifying picture. With the international pressure mounting and extreme threats on most of Pakistan’s border, the need of the hour is a show of unity. Instead the differences are now out, open in air. Gilani and Kiyani may have repeatedly said that there are to differences, but the facts that I pen below proves just the opposite.
When the government took over and made an attempt to bring the ISI under interior ministry, the army used its iron hand to force the government to withdraw. Later came the lame excuses from the government. This was an extreme example of an attempt to gain the high ground by the government which failed.
When President Zardari rescinded his promise of first official visit to China and instead preferred a pilgrimage to the White House, the COAS (Kiyani) flew to China on the same day that Zardari went to USA and also stayed for an exactly same number of days (maybe one less, I can’t remember exactly now). This showed where the government’s inclination was in the developemnt of foreign policy while the army preferred an opposite track.
The defense minister claimed that Pakistan was incapable of hitting down the US drones. Immediately came out the Chief of Air Staff with an in-your-face response that the PAF is fully capable and waiting for a green signal from the government. Again, both parties were at odds.
President Zardari promised never to use the nukes first (changing the policy which the former President framed when he said that the nukes were not made to be shelved). This provoked a reaction not only from the establishment but also the nuclear scientist Dr. Samar Mubarakmand voiced his dissent against this policy. Not surprisingly, the army never agreed and this message was also forwarded to the presidency.
Immediately after the Mumbai attacks PM Gilani acceded to send the ISI chief to India. He was forced on the back foot, bringing shame to Pakistan, only to realize later what he had done (this couldn’t be unintentional). Later, the government tried to save face by claiming that any director-level rep of ISI would be sent and there was some lack of communication. Again, the ISI/army refused.
And now when the IAF jets violated Pakistani airspace, the PAF reacted strongly while the government seems apologetic saying it was an honest mistake. Who are they actually representing? Which side are they on?
It is this internal conflict that makes the enemies brave enough to attack a country. In this in-fight is suffering the sovereignity of Pakistan. If a choice has to be made between the current government and the army, even the harshest critics of army will be forced to reconsider.
Pakistan Zindabad!
Welcome Back To 90's
It didn’t take long for Nawaz Sharif to declare an open war against PPP. This was the script of the show with the departure of Pervez Musharraf, the reason PML-N stayed in the coalition for so long. Now that Pervez Musharraf is out, they had to oppose PPP to continue their politics, mostly that of confrontation.
The ground is all set for the battle in Punjab, which is the most important province to conquer if one is to sustain a government in center. The appointment of Salman Taseer was a key indication of PPP’s foresight.
Nawaz was quiet all along and kept hanging on just to jam all ways of PPP’s alliance with Pervez Musharraf. Now that his agenda is fulfilled, it didn’t take him long to part ways with his bitter enemy.
Many bloggers predicted this the day Musharraf resigned. Ammar talked about the start of a cat-fight, which is precisely what is happening between the two parties.
The stage is set for the next showdown in Punjab. PML-Q will play the role of kingmaker, as their alliance with any of the two parties will decide the fate of the government.
Its neither the issue of judiciary nor the choice of president that have caused this coalition to break but the imprudence and incompetence of this lot of politicians has resulted in the failure of this coalition. They were never sincere with the issues of the people, all they wanted was to get rid of Musharraf and get a share of power to fill their pockets. The provincial assemblies are busy criticising Musharraf and endorsing Zardari, completely ignoring the issues of the people of Pakistan.
This has always been the real face of these political parties and those who believed in a certain change of betterment after 18th Feb were living in a fool’s paradise.
The parties are busy playing the dirty game of politics with the camouflage of democracy. This should remind us the last few words of our former President:
Pakistan Ka Khuda Hafiz
